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# 网络安全技术

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
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# Symmetric Key Encryption

# Crypto – a brief introduction

- **Cryptology** — The art and science of making and breaking “secret codes”
- **Cryptography** — making “secret codes”
  - ychrpyaprtgo
  - $C = M \oplus K$
- **Cryptanalysis** — breaking “secret codes”
  - ychrpyaprtgo is cracked to \_\_\_\_\_, QED.
- **Crypto** — all of the above (and **more**)
  - **More** on non-repudiation (signature), authentication, identification, zero-knowledge, commitment, and **more**...
  - Any reference books?... Bruce Schneier, HAC

A cipher or cryptosystem is used for encrypting/decrypting a plaintext/ciphertext



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# Cryptanalysis

## Basic assumption

- ❑ Known as **Kerckhoffs Principle**
- ❑ The system is completely known to the attacker
- ❑ Only the key is secret
- ❑ Crypto algorithms are not secret
- ❑ No “security through obscurity”

## Objective of an attacker

- ❑ Identify secret key used to encrypt a ciphertext
- ❑ (OR) recover the plaintext of a ciphertext without the secret key

## Examples of (Classical) Symmetric Key Encryption Algorithms – Classical Cryptography


Ciphertexts:

1. **IRXUVFRUHDAGVHYHABHDUVDIR**
2. **VSRQJHEREVTXDUHSDQWU**

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C

**Simple Substitution:** each plaintext letter is substituted by a distinct ciphertext letter

**EIMBULJIWLN YANJMVLIURAHIWAI**




**DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE**

- What's the ciphertext of "solutionstofinaleexam"?

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## An example of simple substitution...

Copyright 2002 by Randy Glasbergen.  
[www.glasbergen.com](http://www.glasbergen.com)



**“Encryption software is expensive...so we just rearranged all the letters on your keyboard.”**

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# An Example

Ciphertext (encrypted using simple substitution)

PBFPVYFBQXZTYFPBFEQJHDXXQVAPTPQJKTOYQWIPBVWLXTOXBTFXQWAX  
BVCXQWAXFQJVVWLEQNTQZQGGQLFXQWAKVWLXQWAEBIPBFXFQVXGTVJ  
VWLBTPQWAEBFPBFHCVLXBQUFEVWLXGDPEQVPQGVPPBFTIXPFHXZHVFA  
GFOTHFEBQUFTDHBQPOTHXTYFTODXQHFTDPTOGHFQPBQWAQJJTODX  
QHFOQPWTBDHHIXQVAPBFZQHCFWPFHPBFIPBQWKFABVYYDZBOTHBPBQP  
QJTQOTOGHFQAPBFEQJHDXXQVAVXEBQPEFZBVFOJIWFFACCCFHQWAUV  
WFLQHGFVAFXQHUFHILTAVWAFFAWTEVOITDHFHFQAITIXPFHXAQHEF  
ZQWGFLVWPTOFFA

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Question: how secure is Simple Substitution?

Let's do some analysis...

- A **secret key** (in Simple Substitution) is a *random permutation* of the alphabetic characters.
- E.g.

<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>j</i>	<i>k</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>m</i>
<i>X</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>T</i>

<i>n</i>	<i>o</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>q</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>s</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>u</i>	<i>v</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>y</i>	<i>z</i>
<i>S</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>

- Each permutation is a potential candidate of the secret key
- Question: how many distinct permutations are there? (in other words, how many distinct secret keys are in the key space?)

- 
- Total number of possible permutations

**26!**

- $26! = 403,291,461,126,605,635,584,000,000$  (27 digits)  $\approx 2^{88}$
- Maybe... write a computer program to try all the possible keys exhaustively... (so-called **Brute-force Attack**)
- **Calculation:** suppose we have one million 3GHz PCs which can try 3 billion permutations per second, the machines will take **4,263 years** to try all the  $26!$  permutations...
  - Not so efficient
- **Question: any better cracking algorithm?**

# Statistical Attack / Character Frequency Attack

- An interesting observation on simple substitution: the relative letter frequencies do not change during encryption
- letters in an alphabet are not equally common
- in English, **e** and **t** are by far the most common letters
- Probability distribution of the 26 English letters (Beker and Piper, 1982)

letter	probability	letter	probability
A	.082	N	.067
B	.015	O	.075
C	.028	P	.019
D	.043	Q	.001
<b>E</b>	<b>.127</b>	R	.060
F	.022	S	.063
G	.020	<b>T</b>	<b>.091</b>
H	.061	U	.028
I	.070	V	.010
J	.002	W	.023
K	.008	X	.001
L	.040	Y	.020
M	.024	Z	.001

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## Basic Approach of Statistic Attack:

1. Identify possible encryptions of letter 'e' (the most common English letter)
2. Identify possible diagrams starting/finishing with letter 'e'
3. Use trigrams (e.g. find 'the')
4. Identify word boundaries

Iterate the above for the 2<sup>nd</sup> most common English letter and so on.

Ciphertext:

PBFPVYFBQXZTYFPBFEQJHDXXQVAPTPQJKTOYQWIPBVWLXTOXBTFXQWAX  
BVCXQWAXFQJVVWLEQNTQZQGGQLFXQWAKVWLXQWAEBIPBFXFQVXGTVJV  
WLBTPQWAEBFPBFHCVLXBQUFEVWLXGDPEQVPQGVPPBFTIXPFHXZHVFAG  
FOTHFEBQUFTDHBZBQPOTHTYFTODXQHFTDPTOGHFQPBQWAQJJTODXQH  
FOQPWTBDHHIXQVAPBFZQHCFWPFHPBFIPBQWKFABVYYDZBOTHBPBQPQT  
QOTOGHFQAPBFEQJHDXXQVAVXEBQPEFZBVFOJIWFFACCFCHQWAUVWFL  
QHGFVAFXQHFUFHILTTAVWAFFAWTEVOITDHFHFQAITIXPFHXAFQHEFZQW  
GFLVWPTOFFA

Ciphertext frequency counts:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
21	26	6	10	12	51	10	25	10	9	3	10	0	1	15	28	42	0	0	27	4	24	22	28	6	8

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Question: How to build a symmetric key cryptosystem which is secure against statistical attack?



# One-time Pad Encryption

Encryption: Plaintext  $\oplus$  Key = Ciphertext

e=000 h=001 i=010 k=011 l=100 r=101 s=110 t=111

	h	e	i	l	h	i	t	l	e	r
Plaintext:	001	000	010	100	001	010	111	100	000	101
Key:	111	101	110	101	111	100	000	101	110	000
Ciphertext:	110	101	100	001	110	110	111	001	110	101
	s	r	l	h	s	s	t	h	s	r

e=000 h=001 i=010 k=011 l=100 r=101 s=110 t=111

**Decryption:** Ciphertext  $\oplus$  Key = Plaintext

	s	r	l	h	s	s	t	h	s	r
Ciphertext:	110	101	100	001	110	110	111	001	110	101
Key:	111	101	110	101	111	100	000	101	110	000
Plaintext:	001	000	010	100	001	010	111	100	000	101
	h	e	i	l	h	i	t	l	e	r

- ❑ Pad must be random, **used only once**
- ❑ Pad has the same size as message

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**Questions: What are the current symmetric key cryptosystems?**


There are many...

They can be categorized into two types:

1.Stream Cipher

2.Block Cipher

# Stream Ciphers



- Secret key length: 128 bits, 256 bits, etc.
- Maximum plaintext length: usually can be arbitrarily long.
- **Security:** Given a “long” segment of keystream (e.g.  $2^{40}$  bits), the secret key cannot be derived AND the subsequent segment of the keystream cannot be deducted.

# RC4

- A stream cipher
- **Ron's code version 4** (Ronald Rivest)
- Stream ciphers are generally faster than block ciphers
- RC4
  - Stage 1: RC4 initialization
  - Stage 2: RC4 keystream generation

# RC4 Initialization

## □ Setup:

byte **key**[N]; // secret key (e.g. N = 16, i.e. 128-bit key)

byte K[256]; // keying material

byte S[256]; // internal states

## □ Initialization:

for i = 0 to 255

    S[i] = i

    K[i] = **key**[i (mod N)]

j = 0

for i = 0 to 255

    j = (j + S[i] + K[i]) mod 256

    swap(S[i], S[j])

i = j = 0

- S[] is the permutation of 0,1,...,255

# RC4 Keystream Generation

- To output a keystream byte, swap table elements and select a byte

- ▣ Keystream generation:

```
i = (i + 1) mod 256
```

```
j = (j + S[i]) mod 256
```


```
swap(S[i], S[j])
```

```
t = (S[i] + S[j]) mod 256
```

```
KeyStreamByteSelected = S[t]
```

- Use the KeyStreamByteSelected to do XOR with one byte of plaintext, then iterate the keystream generation steps above for getting another byte of keystream
- **Note:** Some research results show that the first 256 bytes must be discarded, otherwise attacker may be able to recover the **key**.

# Block Ciphers





- A block cipher takes a *block* of **plaintext** and a **secret key**, produces a *block* of **ciphertext**.
- The key is **reused** for different plaintext blocks
- Typical block sizes: 64 bits, 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits
- Key sizes: 56 bits (DES), 128/192/256 bits (AES)
- Popular block ciphers: DES, 3DES, AES, Twofish, Serpent



# (Iterated) Block Cipher

- Ciphertext obtained from plaintext by iterating a **round function**
- Input to round function consists of key and the output of previous round
- DES: 16 rounds of Feistel round function
  - Block size: 64 bits
  - Key size: 56 bits





One  
Round  
of  
DES

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# Security of DES

- Security of DES depends solely on the internals of  $f$
- Thirty years of intense analysis has revealed no “back door”
- The most effective attack today against DES is still the exhaustive key search (aka brute force attack)

# Exhaustive Key Search

- Given a plaintext  $x$  and corresponding ciphertext  $y$ , every possible key would be tested until a key  $K$  is found such that

$$E(K, x) = y$$

Note: there may be more than one such key  $K$ .

- For DES, total number of keys =  $2^{56} \approx 7.2 \times 10^{16}$  keys
- Assume at the speed of  $10^6$  encryptions per second, it would need more than 1000 years to break DES.
- Diffie and Hellman postulated in 1977 that a DES cracking machine with  $10^6$  processors, each could test  $10^6$  keys per second, could be built for about US\$20M.
  - This machine can break DES in about 10 hours.

# Exhaustive Key Search

- In 1993, Michael Wiener presented a pipelined chip which tests  $5 \times 10^7$  DES keys per second.
  - Each chip could cost US\$10 and a frame of 5760 chips would cost about \$100K.

Machine Unit Cost	Expected Time
\$100,000 (1 frame)	35 hours
\$1,000,000 (10 frames)	3.5 hours
\$10,000,000 (100 frames)	21 minutes

- In 1998, DES cracker (nicknamed "Deep Crack" [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EFF\\_DES\\_cracker](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EFF_DES_cracker)) was built by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).
  - It performs  $2^{56}$  DES operations in 56 hours.
  - Cost: US\$250K (first piece), US\$50K - \$75K (duplicates).
- Software version of DES cracking effort can be found at <http://www.distributed.net/des/>


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# What Should We Use Today?

- 3DES (or Triple DES)
- AES (or Rijndael)
- Other candidates
  - Twofish
  - RC6
  - Serpent


## Triple DES and DESX

- **Triple DES**: two 56-bit keys



- **DESX**: three keys

$$C = K_3 \oplus \text{DES}(K_2, M \oplus K_1)$$



- Similar security to DES using differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis, which are theoretical attacks
- But much harder to break using exhaustive key search than DES.

What are the sizes of K1, K2, and K3?

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
# Advanced Encryption Standard

- Replacement for DES
- AES competition (late 90's)
  - NSA openly involved
  - Many strong algorithms were proposed and cryptanalyzed publicly
  - Rijndael Algorithm was ultimately selected
    - Pronounced like “Rain Doll” or “Rhine Doll”
- Iterated block cipher (like DES)
- Not using Feistel round function (unlike DES)



# AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

- **Replacement of DES**
- **Block size:** 128 bits
- **Key length:** 128, 192 or 256 bits (independent of block size)
- 10 to 14 rounds (depends on key length)
- Each round uses 4 functions (in 3 “layers”)
  - ByteSub (nonlinear layer)
  - ShiftRow (linear mixing layer)
  - MixColumn (nonlinear layer)
  - AddRoundKey (key addition layer)




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# Key Space

- The Key Space of a cipher is the set of all possible and distinct secret keys
  - E.g. The key space of DES is all distinct 56-bit binary strings
  - E.g. The size of the key space of simple substitution for case-insensitive English alphabet is 26!
- What's the key space size of AES?
- What's the key space size of RC4?

# Multiple Blocks



- How to encrypt multiple blocks?
- A new key for each block?
  - As bad as (or worse than) the one-time pad!
- Encrypt each block independently?
- Make encryption depend on previous block(s), i.e., “chain” the blocks together?
- How to handle partial blocks?

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# Modes of Operation

- Many modes of operation — we discuss three
- Electronic Codebook (**ECB**) mode
  - Obvious thing to do
  - Encrypt each block independently
  - There is a serious weakness
- Cipher Block Chaining (**CBC**) mode
  - Chain the blocks together
  - More secure than ECB
- Counter Mode (**CTR**) mode
  - Acts like a stream cipher
  - Popular for random access

# ECB Mode


- Notations:  $C = E(K, P)$   $P = D(K, C)$
- Given plaintext  $P = P_0, P_1, \dots, P_m, \dots$  (in blocks)
- Obvious way of using a block cipher is to encrypt plaintext blocks independently

## Encrypt

$$\begin{aligned}C_0 &= E(K, P_0), \\C_1 &= E(K, P_1), \\C_2 &= E(K, P_2), \dots\end{aligned}$$

## Decrypt

$$\begin{aligned}P_0 &= D(K, C_0), \\P_1 &= D(K, C_1), \\P_2 &= D(K, C_2), \dots\end{aligned}$$



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# ECB Cut and Paste Attack

- Suppose plaintext is

Alice digs Bob. Trudy digs Tom.

- Assuming 64-bit blocks and 8-bit ASCII:

$P_0 = \text{"Alice di"}, P_1 = \text{"gs Bob. "}$ ,

$P_2 = \text{"Trudy di"}, P_3 = \text{"gs Tom. "}$

- Ciphertext:  $C_0, C_1, C_2, C_3$

- Trudy cuts and pastes:  $C_0, C_3, C_2, C_1$

- Decrypts as

Alice digs Tom. Trudy digs Bob.


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## ECB Weakness

- Suppose  $P_i = P_j$
- Then  $C_i = C_j$  and Trudy knows  $P_i = P_j$
- This gives Trudy some information, even if she does not know  $P_i$  or  $P_j$
- Is this a serious issue?

# Alice Hates ECB Mode

- Alice's uncompressed image, Alice ECB encrypted



- Why does this happen?
- Same plaintext block  $\Rightarrow$  same ciphertext!



# CBC Mode


- Blocks are “chained” together
- A random initialization vector, or IV, is required to initialize CBC mode
- IV is random, but is not a secret

## Encryption

$$\begin{aligned}C_0 &= E(K, IV \oplus P_0), \\C_1 &= E(K, C_0 \oplus P_1), \\C_2 &= E(K, C_1 \oplus P_2), \dots\end{aligned}$$


## Decryption

$$\begin{aligned}P_0 &= IV \oplus D(K, C_0), \\P_1 &= C_0 \oplus D(K, C_1), \\P_2 &= C_1 \oplus D(K, C_2), \dots\end{aligned}$$



# Alice Likes CBC Mode

- Alice's uncompressed image, Alice CBC encrypted



- Why does this happen?
- Same plaintext yields different ciphertext!

# Counter Mode (CTR)

- Use block cipher like stream cipher

## Encryption

$$C_0 = P_0 \oplus E(K, IV),$$

$$C_1 = P_1 \oplus E(K, IV+1),$$

$$C_2 = P_2 \oplus E(K, IV+2), \dots$$


## Decryption

$$P_0 = C_0 \oplus E(K, IV),$$

$$P_1 = C_1 \oplus E(K, IV+1),$$

$$P_2 = C_2 \oplus E(K, IV+2), \dots$$

- CTR is good for random access (both READ and WRITE)
- CBC is good for random READ only, but not WRITE



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# Summary

- **Kerckhoffs Principle**
- **Simple Substitution Encryption and statistical attack**
- **One-time Pad Encryption**
- **Stream Cipher: RC4**
- **Block Cipher: DES, AES**
- **Key Space**
- **Modes of Operation**