

**Questions:**

1. **Key Exchange** Consider the following protocol, where  $E$  is a symmetric key encryption scheme, and  $K$  is computed as  $K = g^{ab}$ .

$$\begin{aligned} A &\rightarrow B &&: \text{“I’m Alice”, } g^a \\ A &\leftarrow B &&: \text{“Bob”, } g^b, E_K([g^a, g^b]_{\text{Bob}}) \\ A &\rightarrow B &&: \text{“Alice”, } E_K([g^a, g^b]_{\text{Alice}}) \end{aligned}$$

- (a) What is the long-term secret of this scheme?
- (b) Does the protocol support forward secrecy?
2. **Authentication** Consider the following protocol, where  $E$  is a symmetric key encryption scheme and  $K$  is a long-term symmetric key shared between  $A$  and  $B$ .

$$\begin{aligned} A &\rightarrow B &&: \text{“Alice”, } R_1 \\ A &\leftarrow B &&: R_2, E_K(R_1) \\ A &\rightarrow B &&: E_K(R_2) \end{aligned}$$

- (a) Does the scheme support session key establishment? If not, modify the protocol so that it does.
- (b) Does your protocol proposed in (a) support Perfect Forward Secrecy? If not, modify it so it supports PFS without adding any new encryption, digital signature or additional message flows.